Book: Night Raiders: The Story of the Legendary Unit 101 During the IDF Retribution Operations
Author: Uzi Eilam
Pages: 369
I chose this book to get a foundation on the history of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the early years so that I could better understand their approach to their retaliatory invasion of Gaza Strip after the October 2023 attacks. I was not disappointed as this book discussed the IDF from their beginnings during Israel’s War of Independence in 1948 where they fought with Egypt, Jordan & Syria. After this, there was a decline in the morale and professionalism within the IDF, showing their weakness to their neighbors. As a result, this led to increased filtrations from Egypt & Jordan to kill Israelis and steal their equipment, livestock, etc. along/within the borders of Israel. Later on, terrorism was the primary objective.
Unit 101 was created in August 1953 and was folded into Battalion 890 in January of 1954. Battalion 890 is a mobile unit (probably similar to today’s US Rangers) designed to strike back at Jordan & Egyptian military/police targets in nighttime raids in an even greater response to the original infiltration. They would target these facilities direcly across the border from the original infiltration to encourage Jordan/Egyptian governments to restrain/prevent their own citizensfrom conducting terrorist raids across the border into Israel. The mobile unit continued through the end of 1956.
There were four principles associated with Unit 101: boldness, surprise, mobility & deception. What the unit learned in these small groups were then later transferred to the Battalion and ultimately to the entire IDF – mostly by finding good comomanders and “training-the-trainers” to train other commanders.
What I learned from the book was the following:
1) During this time, the IDF’s response to an infiltration was not an eye for an eye, but an eye for an eye, ear, nose & throat. By that I mean, if the infiltration killed 1-2 citizens, the Unit would kill 10+ military/policemen (they never killed women or children) and often blew up a builiding or two.
2) Their apprach appeared to be haphazard, but it was actually more of an “On-The-Job-Training” approach. They believed that the best training was an actual battle as they did not have the time or resources for exclusive training. The leaders of the unit believed that first that the speed of execution and penetration into the heart of the camp was a primary objective. To wage this unorganized type of warfare (at least then, not now) the unit had to hae freedom of action (decentralized thinking). It was important to keep the units small – excess men meant excess casualties. Additonally, small groups of men all knew each other, slept & ate together and fought harder together.
3) If there were multiple targets in one night, then multiple units would attack all the objectives simultaneously to prevent them from offering a defense from a unified body, reducing the enemies to fight as individuals or one positioni at a time.
The following lessons will increase my prospects for success after prison:
1) Sometimes to succeed, you need to take an unorthodox approach. The unit type tactics were new to the IDF.
2) Decentralization is a better approach. The man on the ground knows better than the man back at HQ.
3) Speed of execution is important. That is why I went to the library on my first day of prison and started learning Spanish on Day 3. There is no time to be lost.
4) While training on anything important, you value can be magnified by “Training-the-Trainers,” so that that they can continue training others. Also, On-the-Job training is always the best training in the end. First tell someone, then show someone and then let them learn by doing it.
Dennis Zeedyk
